In June, the Illinois Supreme Court found the law requiring the secretary of state to suspend the driver's licenses of underage drinkers constitutional. After the ruling in the consolidated case of People v. Zachary R. Boeckmann, et al., traffic court judges are now required to suspend the license of underage drivers for three months if these teens have been ticketed for underage drinking.
To learn more about underage drinking laws in Illinois, see Illinois Minor in Possession of Alcohol Laws.
The matter of People v. Zachary ("Zachary") is distinguished because the underage teen does not have to receive a traffic ticket for driving under the influence of alcohol to have his/her license suspended. It is sufficient that the teen be found guilty of underage drinking. The defendants in the matter of Zachary, pleaded guilty to their 2008 underage drinking charges, but appealed the constitutionality of 625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(43). They argued that this section violated their due process and equal protection rights because there was no connection between the suspension of their driver's licenses and an underage drinking offense that does not involve an automobile or other motor vehicle.
Obviously, the majority of the justices on the Illinois Supreme Court thought differently. In a twelve-page opinion drafted by Justice Thomas L. Kilbride, the court stated: "It is reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking." The court went on to add that "preventing young people from driving after consuming alcohol unquestionably furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles."
In finding section 206 constitutional the court discussed the matter of People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 124 (1989) extensively. In Linder, the trial judge deemed section 206 unconstitutional. The court in Lindner held that revoking the defendant's driving privileges based on his sex offense was a violation of his constitutional right to due process. Justice Kilbride argued that the defendants relied on a too narrow an interpretation of Lindner in their argument that a suspension or revocation of driving privileges is unconstitutional when no motor vehicle was involved in the offense. Justice Linder wrote "[t]he rationale in Lindner is broader than simply determining whether a vehicle was involved in the offense. Rather, the critical determination is whether the revocation of driving privileges bears a relationship to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles."
